Nepal: A vital bridge between China and India
Yuba Nath Lamsal
For more than 240 years, Nepal's strategic position was interpreted from a
narrow perspective, which limited our foreign policy options. Prithivi
Narayan Shah, who unified Nepal by bringing together several tiny
principalities with the strength of his swords, defined Nepal's strategic
location as the one like a yam between two boulders. His interpretation of
Nepal's strategic position was on the basis of regional situation followed
by strength and attitude of the two powerful neighbors both in the north and
the south. Prithivi Narayan Shah likened China in the north and British in
the south (India) as the two boulders and tiny Nepal which was just
struggling for survival as a fragile yam.
The analogy of yam and boulders might have been true during the period of
Prithivi Narayan Shah. This was the time when Nepal was on the unification
campaign and had to act cautiously so that its military campaign would not
end up in confrontation with the two empires. The sole strategy of Nepal was
to protect the newly conquered territories and maintain Nepal's sovereign
status intact. Against that background, it was definitely a move not to
provoke any of the powerful neighbors. Even if Nepal chose to confront with
any of the neighbors, it was bound to be crushed given the military power of
its neighbours. In such a fragile situation the definition of Nepal's
strategic location as a 'yam between two boulders' held meaning and
significance. This was mainly aimed at protecting the fragile and weak
country from external aggression and attack.
The rulers, policy makers and interlocutors of Nepal's foreign policy and
strategic policy formulation kept on parroting this phrase for 240 years
without giving an iota of thought whether this definition held any meaning
and significance in the present changed national, regional and international
situation. When this phrase was first coined, Nepal did not have contact
beyond Britain and China and had no other option other than co-existing with
the reality and molding its strategic and foreign policy accordingly.
But the situation changed in the 50s as British colonial rulers left South
Asia which gave birth to two young nations in the region-India and Pakistan.
In the north, too, an old empire crumbled and a new communist regime was
installed through a revolution in its place. This heralded anew situation
and opportunities in South Asia including Nepal. However, Nepal failed to
cash in on this newly emerged situation. Instead, the regime in Kathmandu
continued with the same old mindset and Nepal failed to reap benefits out of
the changed national and international situation.
Until British colonial power was ruling in South Asia, Nepal's Rana
oligarchic regime maintained its hold on power with patronage from the
British rulers. This had been in practice for years since the Sugauli Treaty
which rendered Nepal into virtually semi-colonial status. Even after 1947
that not only marked the departure of the British colonial era in South Asia
but also saw the birth of India and Pakistan, Nepal's regime, instead of
seeking new role and asserting its rights, capitulated to the new regime in
Delhi. As British charted out two countries in South Asia when they were
leaving, Nepal could have tried to take back its territories lost during the
Anglo-Nepal war and could have scrapped all previous treaties made with
colonial powers.
But the old regime in Kathmandu sought and followed the diktats from New
Delhi in order to protect its beleaguered regime which had been under severe
pressure and crisis from the burgeoning people's movement for political
change. Nepal's regime had under the impression that it could crush the
democratic movement with support from India's new regime. Delhi knew the
mentality of Nepal's Rana regime and exploited this situation for India's
interest. India, thus, proposed a new treaty to reinforce the Sugauli Treaty
in a new version that limited Nepal's sovereign right. With formal signing
of the treaty of 1950 ( Nepal-India Treaty of Friendship-1950), India's
purpose was served and the treaty brought Nepal under its security ambit.
Nepal's regime was well assured of its longevity with support from Indian
regime. However, people's movement continued unabated, which ultimately
forced the Rana regime out of power.
After the change of the regime in Kathmandu in 1951, New Delhi gave the
impression that the political change that Nepal saw was gifted by India.
Under this false pretext, New Delhi intervened in Nepal's internal political
affairs so badly that ultimately gave rise to heavy anti-India sentiment in
Nepal. The new regime in Kathmandu could have undone all the previous
agreements with India and started bilateral relations afresh on the basis of
mutual equality and common interest. However, it did not happen as the
rulers including the king and parties chose to remain in power with backing
from India. Their foreign and security policy, too, remained India centric
and did not try to diversify Nepal's relations to suit with the changed
context both at home and abroad.
Some efforts were, however, made in the sixties to diversify Nepal's
diplomatic relations in the international arena. It was the period when
Nepal established its diplomatic relationship with China, United Nations and
several other countries. But the core objective of Nepal's foreign policy
formulation continued to remain India centric. With the imposition of
Panchayat regime by the king, the same foreign policy was given continuity,
although some rhetorical changes were seen in foreign policy front. A feeble
attempt was made to come out from India's domination after king Birendra's
rise to power. As a young monarch, who had been educated in the West, wanted
some innovative ideas in the governance and foreign policy of Nepal. The
Zone of Peace (ZOP) proposal was king Birendra's brainchild, which, in
principle, aimed at bringing Nepal out of India's influence. The
international community had taken Nepal's ZOP proposal positively and 116
countries including China and the United States of America had supported it.
Even Soviet Union had initially appreciated the ZOP and had assured to
support it. The Soviet Union backed out later following India's insistence.
Almost all South Asian countries had also supported this move. Nepal had
planned to propose the ZOP proposal in the United Nations for its approval.
Had it been endorsed by the United Nations, it would have been Nepal's big
diplomatic achievement and would have enhanced Nepal's clout and position in
the international arena. The support Nepal's ZOP proposal had gotten from
116 countries was not a mean achievement. But it was suddenly and without
any justification abandoned soon after the political change in 1990
ostensibly from India's pressure. Although this ZOP proposal was initiated
by the absolute monarch and dictatorial Panchayat regime, it was in the
interest of Nepal, which could have been given continuity even after the
political change. This once again proved that India was successful in
scuttling Nepal's struggle for an independent and distinct posture and an
effort to come out of India's domination. It is a clear example how India
wrecks Nepal's initiative for independent policies, in which Nepal's
dominant political parties of that period mainly the Nepali Congress and the
CPN-UML either capitulated to New Delhi's pressure or deliberately chose to
remain under India's security and foreign policy domain.
Despite these efforts, the overall attitude of Nepali rulers and the
so-called intellectual remained India centric who continued to define and
analyze Nepal's security and foreign policy from the old perspective. With
the tremendous change in the field of science and technology that has
brought the world closer, any particular country cannot remain isolated from
the world. At the same time, a sea change has taken place in security and
foreign policy concept in the world. But Nepal's policy makers have failed
to grasp this new reality in the changed national and international scene.
Our interlocutors of foreign policy continued to subscribe to the old and
outdated views of analyzing Nepal's geo-political and geo-strategic position
as being a ' yam between the two boulders'. This definition limits Nepal's
scope of expanding its strategic and foreign policy beyond India and China.
Lately, a new realization has dawned on some of Nepal's political leaders
who not only rejected the old definition but devised a new and realistic
analysis of Nepal's geo-strategic and geo-political position. Maoist leader,
who is also the chief of the international department of his party, is,
perhaps, the first one to publicly oppose the old definition. In contrast to
the old definition of Nepal's geo-strategic position, Mahara, instead, said
that ' Nepal is not a yam between the two boulders but a bridge between
China and India'. The same view was echoed by Prime Minister Jahalanath
Khanal recently. This is a positive development in our strategic and foreign
policy front. Both Mahara and Khanal are absolutely right. But this has to
be explicitly reflected in the policy as well as in practice.
Nepal is indeed a bridge between not only China and India but also between
South Asia and East Asia. Now Asia is growing as a global economic
powerhouse. China has already become the second largest economy. The
predictions are that China may grow as world's largest economy surpassing
the United States in a couple of decades. The pace and manner with which
Chinese economy is growing and the magnitude of recession the United States
is suffering are the indication that China is going to surpass the United
States in the near future. Similarly, India, too, is growing economically,
despite its serious internal problems. Against this background, the global
strategic focus has taken a paradigm shift. Asia in general and China and
India in particular are becoming the epicenter of global power in the 21st
century. Nepal being located between these two global giants has strategic
as well as economic advantage. In the near future, Nepal would be a global
center for various reasons. Moreover, Nepal could also be a center of
international business not only between China and India but also a global
hub. If handled properly and wisely, Nepal can be another Singapore and Hong
Kong in terms of international trade and business. Thus, Nepal is not a '
yam between two boulders' but a bridge between China and India and also the
future international strategic and commercial hub. Thus, our policy makers
and politicians must shun the old hangover and begin a fresh so that Nepal
could be an international power in the future.
For more than 240 years, Nepal's strategic position was interpreted from a
narrow perspective, which limited our foreign policy options. Prithivi
Narayan Shah, who unified Nepal by bringing together several tiny
principalities with the strength of his swords, defined Nepal's strategic
location as the one like a yam between two boulders. His interpretation of
Nepal's strategic position was on the basis of regional situation followed
by strength and attitude of the two powerful neighbors both in the north and
the south. Prithivi Narayan Shah likened China in the north and British in
the south (India) as the two boulders and tiny Nepal which was just
struggling for survival as a fragile yam.
The analogy of yam and boulders might have been true during the period of
Prithivi Narayan Shah. This was the time when Nepal was on the unification
campaign and had to act cautiously so that its military campaign would not
end up in confrontation with the two empires. The sole strategy of Nepal was
to protect the newly conquered territories and maintain Nepal's sovereign
status intact. Against that background, it was definitely a move not to
provoke any of the powerful neighbors. Even if Nepal chose to confront with
any of the neighbors, it was bound to be crushed given the military power of
its neighbours. In such a fragile situation the definition of Nepal's
strategic location as a 'yam between two boulders' held meaning and
significance. This was mainly aimed at protecting the fragile and weak
country from external aggression and attack.
The rulers, policy makers and interlocutors of Nepal's foreign policy and
strategic policy formulation kept on parroting this phrase for 240 years
without giving an iota of thought whether this definition held any meaning
and significance in the present changed national, regional and international
situation. When this phrase was first coined, Nepal did not have contact
beyond Britain and China and had no other option other than co-existing with
the reality and molding its strategic and foreign policy accordingly.
But the situation changed in the 50s as British colonial rulers left South
Asia which gave birth to two young nations in the region-India and Pakistan.
In the north, too, an old empire crumbled and a new communist regime was
installed through a revolution in its place. This heralded anew situation
and opportunities in South Asia including Nepal. However, Nepal failed to
cash in on this newly emerged situation. Instead, the regime in Kathmandu
continued with the same old mindset and Nepal failed to reap benefits out of
the changed national and international situation.
Until British colonial power was ruling in South Asia, Nepal's Rana
oligarchic regime maintained its hold on power with patronage from the
British rulers. This had been in practice for years since the Sugauli Treaty
which rendered Nepal into virtually semi-colonial status. Even after 1947
that not only marked the departure of the British colonial era in South Asia
but also saw the birth of India and Pakistan, Nepal's regime, instead of
seeking new role and asserting its rights, capitulated to the new regime in
Delhi. As British charted out two countries in South Asia when they were
leaving, Nepal could have tried to take back its territories lost during the
Anglo-Nepal war and could have scrapped all previous treaties made with
colonial powers.
But the old regime in Kathmandu sought and followed the diktats from New
Delhi in order to protect its beleaguered regime which had been under severe
pressure and crisis from the burgeoning people's movement for political
change. Nepal's regime had under the impression that it could crush the
democratic movement with support from India's new regime. Delhi knew the
mentality of Nepal's Rana regime and exploited this situation for India's
interest. India, thus, proposed a new treaty to reinforce the Sugauli Treaty
in a new version that limited Nepal's sovereign right. With formal signing
of the treaty of 1950 ( Nepal-India Treaty of Friendship-1950), India's
purpose was served and the treaty brought Nepal under its security ambit.
Nepal's regime was well assured of its longevity with support from Indian
regime. However, people's movement continued unabated, which ultimately
forced the Rana regime out of power.
After the change of the regime in Kathmandu in 1951, New Delhi gave the
impression that the political change that Nepal saw was gifted by India.
Under this false pretext, New Delhi intervened in Nepal's internal political
affairs so badly that ultimately gave rise to heavy anti-India sentiment in
Nepal. The new regime in Kathmandu could have undone all the previous
agreements with India and started bilateral relations afresh on the basis of
mutual equality and common interest. However, it did not happen as the
rulers including the king and parties chose to remain in power with backing
from India. Their foreign and security policy, too, remained India centric
and did not try to diversify Nepal's relations to suit with the changed
context both at home and abroad.
Some efforts were, however, made in the sixties to diversify Nepal's
diplomatic relations in the international arena. It was the period when
Nepal established its diplomatic relationship with China, United Nations and
several other countries. But the core objective of Nepal's foreign policy
formulation continued to remain India centric. With the imposition of
Panchayat regime by the king, the same foreign policy was given continuity,
although some rhetorical changes were seen in foreign policy front. A feeble
attempt was made to come out from India's domination after king Birendra's
rise to power. As a young monarch, who had been educated in the West, wanted
some innovative ideas in the governance and foreign policy of Nepal. The
Zone of Peace (ZOP) proposal was king Birendra's brainchild, which, in
principle, aimed at bringing Nepal out of India's influence. The
international community had taken Nepal's ZOP proposal positively and 116
countries including China and the United States of America had supported it.
Even Soviet Union had initially appreciated the ZOP and had assured to
support it. The Soviet Union backed out later following India's insistence.
Almost all South Asian countries had also supported this move. Nepal had
planned to propose the ZOP proposal in the United Nations for its approval.
Had it been endorsed by the United Nations, it would have been Nepal's big
diplomatic achievement and would have enhanced Nepal's clout and position in
the international arena. The support Nepal's ZOP proposal had gotten from
116 countries was not a mean achievement. But it was suddenly and without
any justification abandoned soon after the political change in 1990
ostensibly from India's pressure. Although this ZOP proposal was initiated
by the absolute monarch and dictatorial Panchayat regime, it was in the
interest of Nepal, which could have been given continuity even after the
political change. This once again proved that India was successful in
scuttling Nepal's struggle for an independent and distinct posture and an
effort to come out of India's domination. It is a clear example how India
wrecks Nepal's initiative for independent policies, in which Nepal's
dominant political parties of that period mainly the Nepali Congress and the
CPN-UML either capitulated to New Delhi's pressure or deliberately chose to
remain under India's security and foreign policy domain.
Despite these efforts, the overall attitude of Nepali rulers and the
so-called intellectual remained India centric who continued to define and
analyze Nepal's security and foreign policy from the old perspective. With
the tremendous change in the field of science and technology that has
brought the world closer, any particular country cannot remain isolated from
the world. At the same time, a sea change has taken place in security and
foreign policy concept in the world. But Nepal's policy makers have failed
to grasp this new reality in the changed national and international scene.
Our interlocutors of foreign policy continued to subscribe to the old and
outdated views of analyzing Nepal's geo-political and geo-strategic position
as being a ' yam between the two boulders'. This definition limits Nepal's
scope of expanding its strategic and foreign policy beyond India and China.
Lately, a new realization has dawned on some of Nepal's political leaders
who not only rejected the old definition but devised a new and realistic
analysis of Nepal's geo-strategic and geo-political position. Maoist leader,
who is also the chief of the international department of his party, is,
perhaps, the first one to publicly oppose the old definition. In contrast to
the old definition of Nepal's geo-strategic position, Mahara, instead, said
that ' Nepal is not a yam between the two boulders but a bridge between
China and India'. The same view was echoed by Prime Minister Jahalanath
Khanal recently. This is a positive development in our strategic and foreign
policy front. Both Mahara and Khanal are absolutely right. But this has to
be explicitly reflected in the policy as well as in practice.
Nepal is indeed a bridge between not only China and India but also between
South Asia and East Asia. Now Asia is growing as a global economic
powerhouse. China has already become the second largest economy. The
predictions are that China may grow as world's largest economy surpassing
the United States in a couple of decades. The pace and manner with which
Chinese economy is growing and the magnitude of recession the United States
is suffering are the indication that China is going to surpass the United
States in the near future. Similarly, India, too, is growing economically,
despite its serious internal problems. Against this background, the global
strategic focus has taken a paradigm shift. Asia in general and China and
India in particular are becoming the epicenter of global power in the 21st
century. Nepal being located between these two global giants has strategic
as well as economic advantage. In the near future, Nepal would be a global
center for various reasons. Moreover, Nepal could also be a center of
international business not only between China and India but also a global
hub. If handled properly and wisely, Nepal can be another Singapore and Hong
Kong in terms of international trade and business. Thus, Nepal is not a '
yam between two boulders' but a bridge between China and India and also the
future international strategic and commercial hub. Thus, our policy makers
and politicians must shun the old hangover and begin a fresh so that Nepal
could be an international power in the future.
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