US South Asia policy and Nepal
Yuba Nath Lamsal
Recently, some new but encouraging
developments have taken place in the bilateral relations between Nepal and the
United States. The US Department of State has revoked the
designation of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN-M) as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity under Executive Order 13224, and
as a “terrorist organization” from the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). A statement of the US State Department
says with this decision announced on September 6, the UCPN (Maoist) is no
longer a threat to the United States in Nepal.
According to the statement, after a thorough
review, the United States determined that the UCPN (Maoist) is no longer
engaged in terrorist activity that threatens the security of US nationals or
U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, in recent years, the Maoist party has been
elected as the head of Nepal’s coalition government, has taken steps to
dismantle its military apparatus, and has demonstrated a credible commitment to
pursuing the peace and reconciliation process in Nepal.
This decision came prior to the
arrival of the new American ambassador Peter W Bodde at Kathmandu and also on
the eve of visit of Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian
Affairs Robert O Blake. Ambassador Bodde, a career diplomat, is an experienced
hand in Nepal as well as South Asian affairs as he already served in American
missions in Nepal, India and Pakistan on different capacities. The appointment
of such highly experienced diplomat on Nepal and South Asian affairs as an
ambassador is an indication that the United States has attached greater
importance to Nepal. Also the visit of Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake,
which coincides with the US decision to delist the Maoists from the terrorist
list, also carries special significance in the bilateral relations and also in
the relations with the Maoists.
Although Mr Blake’s visit was
pre-ordained, this is being dubbed as the recognition of the UCPN-Maoist by the
United States as a democratic force and an agent for positive change in Nepal. Mr
Blake was here to formally establish relations with the Maoist party and he has
told the Maoist leadership that he brought with him enormous goodwill of the US
President and American people towards Nepal and Nepalese people. It is thus
expected that bilateral relations and cooperation between Nepal and the United
States would take a new and more positive turn in future, the sign of which are
already visible. The early symptoms are positive, which make all optimistic of
better and friendlier relationship and cooperation between Nepal and the United
States.
Ever since Barak Obama came to power
four years ago, there has been a marked shift and changes in US foreign policy
including Washington’s role and responsibility in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama
adopted different approach in dealing with the world, which has definitely helped
build positive opinion about America in the Muslim world and elsewhere. It had
been expected that Obama administration would effect change in Nepal policy as
well. However, Washington’s Nepal policy remained unchanged for the last four
years and the United States continued with the old hawkish policy of the
conservative Republican President George Bush junior. The second term of
Barrack Obama, who is more likely to be reelected in the election to be held in
November this year, looks promising so far as Nepal-US relations and
cooperation are concerned.
Nepal and the United States have no
problem as Nepal always seeks constructive cooperation from the only super
power of the world. US policy objectives in Nepal include supporting democratic
institutions and economic liberalization, promoting peace and stability in
South Asia, supporting Nepalese independence and territorial integrity, and
alleviating poverty. In principle, these are noble objectives and Nepal
sincerely looks forward to translating these objectives into reality. However,
the practice is not compatible with what it has theoretically prophesized.
With the end of the Cold War, there
had been marked shift in US South Asia policy, which focused more on relations
with India than with other countries in the region. As a result, other South
Asian countries had become little more skeptical and susceptible about US role
and engagement in South Asia. In the changed US policy, the earlier close ally
Pakistan had been and is still being alienated, whereas the US and India have
entered into strategic partnership. This policy was in stark contrast with its
traditional policy. The traditional South Asia policy of the United States was
more balanced with Pakistan being given slightly more weight.
It is to be noted here that India is
the biggest and most powerful country in South Asia in terms of size, economy,
population and military might. Moreover, New Delhi, in a way or the other, has problems
with almost all South Asian countries. South Asian countries are always apprehensive
of India’s attitude and policy. It is not only in South Asia, India’s military
muscle in general and its blue-water navy in particular is a matter of security
concern for China, Myanmar, Thailand and other East Asian countries. Against
this background, the US-India strategic partnership has sent jitters to all
South Asian countries.
Washington’s hobnobbing with India is also in contradiction with the US national security strategy. One of the four key objectives of the American national security strategy is "to ensure security of the United States, its citizens and US allies and partners". The US policy shift in South Asia is in sharp contrast to this fundamental concept and component of the US national security strategy. While the rest of South Asia remained true friends of the United States during the Cold War, India joined the club of America's enemy states—the Soviet Bloc. When the United States was fighting tooth and nail to contain Soviet misadventure, India openly and wholeheartedly backed the Soviet intervention everywhere in the world including Vietnam and Afghanistan. Worse still, New Delhi had signed a long-term strategic and military alliance with the Soviet Union which was clearly targeted against the security of the United States and its allies. In contrast, all other South Asian countries strongly opposed the Soviet adventure and intervention in other countries including Cambodia and Afghanistan and supported US stance.
Quite opposite to what India did during the Cold War, Pakistan has remained ally of the United States since the 1950s. Washington and Islamabad stood shoulder to shoulder in the 1980s to fight the Soviet Union’s brutal occupation of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan war, Pakistan played the role of a frontline country which ultimately forced the Soviet troops to pullout. If Pakistan had not helped the United States, the security contour of South Asia would have been quite different and South Asia's map would not have been as it is today. The Soviet-India strategy was to promote pan-Indianism in South Asia, which would not have been in the interest of South Asian countries as well as the United States and its western allies.
However, in return, Pakistan has got a slap on its face from the United States. The US policy shift in South Asia in favor of a one country in the expense of the rest of South Asian countries would ultimately prove to be America's blunder in future. Now India, which was against the United States during the old difficult days of Cold War, suddenly became Washington’s preferred choice and a strategic partner, whereas the countries that stood firm in support of the US role and position seem to be ignored lots. Washington may lose goodwill of other South Asian countries. What could be greater opportunism on the part of the United States than this?
Washington’s hobnobbing with India is also in contradiction with the US national security strategy. One of the four key objectives of the American national security strategy is "to ensure security of the United States, its citizens and US allies and partners". The US policy shift in South Asia is in sharp contrast to this fundamental concept and component of the US national security strategy. While the rest of South Asia remained true friends of the United States during the Cold War, India joined the club of America's enemy states—the Soviet Bloc. When the United States was fighting tooth and nail to contain Soviet misadventure, India openly and wholeheartedly backed the Soviet intervention everywhere in the world including Vietnam and Afghanistan. Worse still, New Delhi had signed a long-term strategic and military alliance with the Soviet Union which was clearly targeted against the security of the United States and its allies. In contrast, all other South Asian countries strongly opposed the Soviet adventure and intervention in other countries including Cambodia and Afghanistan and supported US stance.
Quite opposite to what India did during the Cold War, Pakistan has remained ally of the United States since the 1950s. Washington and Islamabad stood shoulder to shoulder in the 1980s to fight the Soviet Union’s brutal occupation of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan war, Pakistan played the role of a frontline country which ultimately forced the Soviet troops to pullout. If Pakistan had not helped the United States, the security contour of South Asia would have been quite different and South Asia's map would not have been as it is today. The Soviet-India strategy was to promote pan-Indianism in South Asia, which would not have been in the interest of South Asian countries as well as the United States and its western allies.
However, in return, Pakistan has got a slap on its face from the United States. The US policy shift in South Asia in favor of a one country in the expense of the rest of South Asian countries would ultimately prove to be America's blunder in future. Now India, which was against the United States during the old difficult days of Cold War, suddenly became Washington’s preferred choice and a strategic partner, whereas the countries that stood firm in support of the US role and position seem to be ignored lots. Washington may lose goodwill of other South Asian countries. What could be greater opportunism on the part of the United States than this?
But in the recent days, Washington
seems to have realized that its policy shift has been counterproductive in
South Asia. Moreover, United States could not achieve what it had expected from
strategic partnership with India. As a result, India has now lost its strategic
interest in India and slowly moving away from India. This is because of India’s
unreliability, non-functioning and policy mess. The lack of US interest with
India can be evidenced by the appointment of Nancy Powel as new American
ambassador to India. Powel was ambassador in Nepal prior to her assignment to
New Delhi and this move is considered that the United States has downgraded its
relations with India.
So far as Nepal is concerned, the
Himalayan Republic has been a true friend and always banked on US support for
its survival and development. Nepal does not have any problem with the United
States and instead its support has helped to strike balanced relations with
India and China. The foreign policy objectives that Washington pursued have
given hopes that in case of threat to Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and
territorial integrity, it can bank on international community to protect
Nepal’s interest. But this hope was eroding as the only superpower leaned too
much towards India and started viewing Nepal through the prism of India. This
was the main cause of worry for Nepal.
Now things seem to be changing and
Washington appears to be in new mood and new approach to deal with Nepal and
Nepal’s political forces. The decision to lift terrorist tag on UCPN-Maoist is
an indication that the United State is now willing to work closely with the
largest political force of Nepal and explore more and newer areas of
cooperation—the fact of which assistant secretary Blake had clearly stated
during his meeting with Nepalese leaders. It is expected that Nepal-US
relations would herald a new era during Ambassador Bodde’s tenure.
Comments
Post a Comment