Nepal's war with British India and its impact on foreign policy

Yuba Nath Lamsal
The Anglo-Nepal war of 1814 and the Sugauli Treaty marked a turning point in Nepal’s foreign policy and diplomacy. The war broke out after all peaceful and diplomatic means applied to settle the issues between Nepal and the British East India Company failed. The war lasted for almost two years in which Nepal suffered a heavy loss to the British imperial power, but still managed to safeguard its independent status.

Serious threat
Nepal had been vigorously consolidating its power and expanding territories by unifying small principalities on the southern side of the Himalayas. British imperial power in India took Nepal’s continued territorial expansion as a serious threat. Thus war became imminent as Nepal’s territorial advancement reached close to the border with areas under the control of East India Company. British had earlier attempted thrice to gain commercial rights and foothold in Nepal through other means. But these efforts had failed due to Nepal’s cautious maneuvering. As a result, British considered a war as the only means to achieve its goal in Nepal.
Convinced that only military pressure was the way to intrude into Nepal and have its political presence and commercial domination, the East India Company was looking for a suitable pretext to invade Nepal. The Butwal and Seuraj incidents served as an immediate excuse for the British to declare a war against Nepal. However, the fundamental factor behind the war was the clash between the British imperial policy to control the entire South Asia and Nepal’s desire to keep its independence intact.
 Nepal was aware of the British imperial design and was always cautious enough to keep the British imperialism at bay. More particularly, Bhimsen Thapa had seen how one Indian state after another had fallen into British control, and he was aware of the next target of British was definitely Nepal. 
Bhimsen Thapa, however, had limited options except war as all other peaceful options had already failed. The fundamental aim of Thapa’s foreign policy was to save Nepal from the ‘clutches of the British imperialism’. The East India Company had been preparing for the war as the Governor General Wellesley of the East India Company had earlier written a letter to Nepal renouncing the 1792 and 1803 treaties, which was a clear indication that the British were going to declare a war.
Thus, Nepal was left with no alternative but to prepare for the war as both war and friendship with the British had been costly for Nepal. Even if Nepal had accepted friendship in British terms, the friendship would also have been costly  for Nepal as the East India Company sought Nepal to give up several newly conquered areas. Nepal Durbar became divided as to whether friendship was to be accepted under British terms or go for war. Bhimsen Thapa argued that  war with the British was imminent as, according to him, timing for the war was appropriate for Nepal as Britain ten had been occupied in Napoleonic war in Europe and management of internal conflicts within India. Thus, Bhimsen Thapa’s logics prevailed and Nepal finally decided to go for the war.
Nepal knew that the East India Company was strong and Nepal’s own strength might not be adequate to defeat the British. Thus, Bhimsen Thapa, tried to forge an alliance with some neighbouring states against the British. In this connection, Nepal wrote to the Chinese emperor asking for support during the war against the British. China, however, rejected Nepal’s request for assistance and refused to get involved in the Anglo-Nepal war.
Bhimsen Thapa then turned to some Indian states for help in the war against the British. He sent envoys to Maratha and Sikh kings in India with an appeal for alliance against the British. But aid from the Maratha and Sikh kings was not forthcoming. Beleaguered Nepal Durbar then came to the conclusion that it had to fight with the British imperialist force alone, which was, indeed, a Herculean task. In the final response to the East India Company, Nepal wrote a letter to the East India Company expressing their will for friendship not in British terms but in Nepal’s own terms, which was obviously not acceptable to the East India Company.  Finally, the East India Company declared a war against Nepal on November 2, 1814.
Soon after the declaration of the war, British troops stormed over Nepalese forces at different points. Nepalese soldiers showed high degree of valor against the sophisticated British army. Nepalese basically fought a defensive war. The war in Kangara was the most notable as poorly equipped Nepalese soldiers could defeat the British troops which were more in number and more sophisticated in terms of weapons. In this connection, Sir Charles Matcalfe’s comment on the Kangara war and bravery of the Nepalese are worth mentioning. He says: “We have met with an enemy who shows decidedly greater bravery and greater steadiness than our troops possesses; and it is impossible to say what may be the end of such reverse of the order of things. In some instances our troops, European and Native, have been repulsed by inferior number with sticks and stones. In others, our troops have been charged by the enemy with swords in hand, and driven for miles like a flock of sheep. In a late instance of complete rout, we lost more muskets by a greater number than there were killed, wounded and missing.” (Nagendra Kumar Singh in his book ‘Nepal and British India’)
Despite gains in a few points, Nepal lost in other fronts of the war being compelled to seek a ceasefire and peace treaty. The palace sent Gajraj Mishra and Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya as the representatives to negotiate with the East India Company for a peace treaty. However, British agent Lt. Col. P. Bradshaw demanded that Nepal should pay compensation for the expenses of the war if the peace treaty was to be signed. The compensation was so huge that Nepalese representatives were not in the position to give their opinion as it involved a large part of landmass in the Terai.
Mishra and Upadhyaya returned to Kathmandu with the message of the British for the peace treaty but the costly British proposal was not acceptable to the Nepal Durbar. Sensing Nepal’s unwillingness, the British later modified their proposal following which a peace treaty was signed between the representatives of Nepal in Sugauli and the East India Company on December 2, 1815. However, Nepal Durbar showed reluctance to ratify the treaty, which led to reoccurrence of hostility between the two powers. Nepal, finally, ratified the Sugauli Treaty on March 4, 1816, which ended the war but limited Nepal’s independent foreign policy handling.

British-centric policy

The Anglo-Nepal war and the subsequent Sugauli Treaty had far-reaching impact on Nepal’s foreign policy and diplomacy. Nepal’s expansionist and aggressive foreign policy came to the final end and Nepal became, as once observed by Prithvi Narayan Shah, truly ‘a yam between the two boulders’. While the 1792 treaty with Tibet-China had limited Nepal’s scope to enlarge its influence in the north, the Sugauli Treaty of 1816 with British India put Nepal’s adventure of territorial expansion to a complete halt. Since then, Nepal’s foreign policy and diplomacy became totally British-centric, which lasted until the political change in Nepal in 1951 that ushered in a democratic era.

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