Saran’s mission: A continuity of Indian design in Nepal
Yuba Nath Lamsal
Last week, Shyam Sharan came to Kathmandu acting as a special emissary of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with the purported objective of further strengthening India’s long held desire to keep Nepali politics under its tight grip. During his stay in the Nepali capital, the former Indian foreign secretary held a flurry of meetings with leaders of different political parties in which Saran prescribed Indian agenda to heal the Nepali political ill. He conveyed the sermon of the Indian establishment to the Nepali parties and leaders to continue with the present ‘democratic (pro-Indian) alliance’. This makes it clear that Saran’s mission was to weaken Nepal’s nationalist forces and keep them out of power and give continuity to the government that is composed of ‘pro-Indian elements’. But it is yet to be seen how far the Indian prescription and design work in Nepali politics.
Some Indian mainstream media portrayed Saran’s visit to Kathmandu as a mission to mediate and bring the squabbling parties together in the wake of their failure to form a new government. Saran, too, confirmed this as he, speaking to the media right after he arrived in Kathmandu, said that he was here to facilitate Nepali parties to ‘forge national consensus so that Nepal’s peace process would be complete and successful’.
In practical sense, Saran’s visit was not aimed at facilitating the peace process in Nepal. The real intention of India is to ensure that the ‘pro-Indian coalition’ does not break. Most importantly, the Madhesi parties, which are the creation of India in general and Shyam Saran in particular, remain together so that India’s interests are best served in Nepal.
The unsolicited advice Sharan tried to impose on Nepali parties is a blatant interference in Nepal’s internal affairs. So far as the mediation, as some Indian media have reported, is concerned, mediation is normally takes place upon request from the two quarrelling parties. However, it is not understood how India got the mandate to mediate in Nepal’s politics as none of the parties, to our notice, had ever requested our southern neighbour to do so. Saran’s self-styled mission of mediation was, therefore, unwarranted, which the entire country and people should have opposed in a collective and united manner.
India has always tried to keep a tab on Nepali politics through conspiracy and coercive approach. The paramount objective of New Delhi’s diplomacy in Nepal has been to ensure that Nepali politics and the government do not go out of Indian influence and grip so that India’s strategic and security interest are well protected in Nepal. To ensure this, India applies all kinds of tactics and techniques—moral or immoral, legal or illegal and diplomatic or otherwise. The Indian design on Nepal was long spelled right after its Independence from Britsh raj which included bringing Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal under Indian union by 2015. India has already occupied Sikkim and has taken over Bhutan’s security and foreign affairs. Guided by this grand strategy of Sikkimization and Bhutanization, India’s Nepal’s policy is being formulated and executed.
The recent developments in Nepal have sent a message to Indian establishment that the politics in Nepal is slowly slipping out of India’s grip. This conclusion was reached following the sudden resignation of Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal even without prior notice of India. India had expected that Mr Nepal, who was installed on the seat of prime minister with India’s assistance, would duly consult before taking such a decision as New Delhi was for the continuation of non-Maoist coalition comprising the Congress, UML and Madhesi parties’.
It is perceived in the diplomatic circle in New Delhi that India’s Nepal’s policy has failed after Rakesh Sood was sent to Kathmandu as ambassador. Sood’s style of acting and approach are not liked by many in Kathmandu even by ‘India friendly people’. Many India watchers comment that Sood behaves as though he is here as a ‘viceroy of British raj’ but not a diplomat. A Nepali diplomat is of the view that Sood’s ‘coercive and arrogant attitude’ has been counterproductive for India in Nepal, which must be reviewed and corrected by Indian establishment if Nepal-India relations are to be made friendlier, cordial and cooperative. Sood’s coercive approach was well validated by the threat on life of a lawmaker allegedly by an official of the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu. Ram Kumar Sharma, who was elected to Constituent Assembly on Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party and later defected to the Maoist party, claimed that a senior and responsible official at the Indian Embassy issued a threat on his life for his defection. As Sood and Indian establishment were out to keep the non-Maoist alliance in power and marginalize the Maoists, lawmaker Sharma not only defected to the UCPN-Maoist but also played a crucial role in bringing some other Madhesi lawmakers into the Maoist fold. As a result, eleven lawmakers of the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum defied party’s decision and voted for the Maoist chairman in the third round of election for prime minister. His move was seen as a direct threat to India’s design to keep the Maoists out of power. If Saran had not intervened, there would have been further fragmentation in the Madhesi parties and Prachanda would have been elected as prime minister in the fourth round of election.
The government of India hurried to send Sharan to Kathmandu with the realization that India’s grip in Nepal’s politics is slowly started fading, which could be well sensed following the split in the Madhesi parties on the issue as to which candidate they should support during the election for premiership. The floor crossing by some lawmakers of the Madhesi parties and voting in favour of Maoist candidate was a matter of serious concern for India. It was perceived as a failure of current Indian Ambassador to Nepal Rakesh Sood in keeping Madhesi parties under India’s control. If Madhesi parties went bizarre, India’s best bait in the entire game plan and its strategic perspective to keep Nepal under its grip would go out of hand.
After the signing of the 12-point agreement that brought the Maoists into the peaceful political mainstream, the South Block had expected that the only anti-Indian force would now be silenced and be in their side. It did not happen after the Maoists went to power following the Constituent Assembly election two years ago. This was more pronounced when the Maoists quit the government following the row with the president on the issue concerning the sacking of the army chief. The Maoists openly criticized India for interfering in Nepal’s politics and vowed to fight back. Since then the relationship between the Indian government and the Maoists has strained.
The Indian establishment looked for a suitable candidate who could handle the situation and make some damage control. Shyam Saran was chosen as the suitable candidate to do this job because of his past record and background. Sharan is familiar with the Nepali politics and political parties as he also served as the ambassador of Nepal. He played a key role in bringing the Maoists and parliamentary parties together to sign the 12-point agreement in New Delhi. Saran was, therefore, perceived to have better understanding with the Maoists as well. Similarly, it was Saran’s initiative to create Madhesi parties in Nepal and his role could be effective in uniting the Madhesi parties together once again.
Saran’s visit was, thus, aimed at keeping the non-Maoist forces together so that the Maoists are out of power. The first priority was to unite the Madhesi parties in which Saran’s mission has been successful. Now India has ensured that the Maoists would not be able to go to power unless they make significant shift in their policy towards India. Saran’s mission was neither to help consensus building nor complete the peace process but to ensure that politics in Nepal may not go out of New Delhi’s hand.
Last week, Shyam Sharan came to Kathmandu acting as a special emissary of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with the purported objective of further strengthening India’s long held desire to keep Nepali politics under its tight grip. During his stay in the Nepali capital, the former Indian foreign secretary held a flurry of meetings with leaders of different political parties in which Saran prescribed Indian agenda to heal the Nepali political ill. He conveyed the sermon of the Indian establishment to the Nepali parties and leaders to continue with the present ‘democratic (pro-Indian) alliance’. This makes it clear that Saran’s mission was to weaken Nepal’s nationalist forces and keep them out of power and give continuity to the government that is composed of ‘pro-Indian elements’. But it is yet to be seen how far the Indian prescription and design work in Nepali politics.
Some Indian mainstream media portrayed Saran’s visit to Kathmandu as a mission to mediate and bring the squabbling parties together in the wake of their failure to form a new government. Saran, too, confirmed this as he, speaking to the media right after he arrived in Kathmandu, said that he was here to facilitate Nepali parties to ‘forge national consensus so that Nepal’s peace process would be complete and successful’.
In practical sense, Saran’s visit was not aimed at facilitating the peace process in Nepal. The real intention of India is to ensure that the ‘pro-Indian coalition’ does not break. Most importantly, the Madhesi parties, which are the creation of India in general and Shyam Saran in particular, remain together so that India’s interests are best served in Nepal.
The unsolicited advice Sharan tried to impose on Nepali parties is a blatant interference in Nepal’s internal affairs. So far as the mediation, as some Indian media have reported, is concerned, mediation is normally takes place upon request from the two quarrelling parties. However, it is not understood how India got the mandate to mediate in Nepal’s politics as none of the parties, to our notice, had ever requested our southern neighbour to do so. Saran’s self-styled mission of mediation was, therefore, unwarranted, which the entire country and people should have opposed in a collective and united manner.
India has always tried to keep a tab on Nepali politics through conspiracy and coercive approach. The paramount objective of New Delhi’s diplomacy in Nepal has been to ensure that Nepali politics and the government do not go out of Indian influence and grip so that India’s strategic and security interest are well protected in Nepal. To ensure this, India applies all kinds of tactics and techniques—moral or immoral, legal or illegal and diplomatic or otherwise. The Indian design on Nepal was long spelled right after its Independence from Britsh raj which included bringing Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal under Indian union by 2015. India has already occupied Sikkim and has taken over Bhutan’s security and foreign affairs. Guided by this grand strategy of Sikkimization and Bhutanization, India’s Nepal’s policy is being formulated and executed.
The recent developments in Nepal have sent a message to Indian establishment that the politics in Nepal is slowly slipping out of India’s grip. This conclusion was reached following the sudden resignation of Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal even without prior notice of India. India had expected that Mr Nepal, who was installed on the seat of prime minister with India’s assistance, would duly consult before taking such a decision as New Delhi was for the continuation of non-Maoist coalition comprising the Congress, UML and Madhesi parties’.
It is perceived in the diplomatic circle in New Delhi that India’s Nepal’s policy has failed after Rakesh Sood was sent to Kathmandu as ambassador. Sood’s style of acting and approach are not liked by many in Kathmandu even by ‘India friendly people’. Many India watchers comment that Sood behaves as though he is here as a ‘viceroy of British raj’ but not a diplomat. A Nepali diplomat is of the view that Sood’s ‘coercive and arrogant attitude’ has been counterproductive for India in Nepal, which must be reviewed and corrected by Indian establishment if Nepal-India relations are to be made friendlier, cordial and cooperative. Sood’s coercive approach was well validated by the threat on life of a lawmaker allegedly by an official of the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu. Ram Kumar Sharma, who was elected to Constituent Assembly on Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party and later defected to the Maoist party, claimed that a senior and responsible official at the Indian Embassy issued a threat on his life for his defection. As Sood and Indian establishment were out to keep the non-Maoist alliance in power and marginalize the Maoists, lawmaker Sharma not only defected to the UCPN-Maoist but also played a crucial role in bringing some other Madhesi lawmakers into the Maoist fold. As a result, eleven lawmakers of the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum defied party’s decision and voted for the Maoist chairman in the third round of election for prime minister. His move was seen as a direct threat to India’s design to keep the Maoists out of power. If Saran had not intervened, there would have been further fragmentation in the Madhesi parties and Prachanda would have been elected as prime minister in the fourth round of election.
The government of India hurried to send Sharan to Kathmandu with the realization that India’s grip in Nepal’s politics is slowly started fading, which could be well sensed following the split in the Madhesi parties on the issue as to which candidate they should support during the election for premiership. The floor crossing by some lawmakers of the Madhesi parties and voting in favour of Maoist candidate was a matter of serious concern for India. It was perceived as a failure of current Indian Ambassador to Nepal Rakesh Sood in keeping Madhesi parties under India’s control. If Madhesi parties went bizarre, India’s best bait in the entire game plan and its strategic perspective to keep Nepal under its grip would go out of hand.
After the signing of the 12-point agreement that brought the Maoists into the peaceful political mainstream, the South Block had expected that the only anti-Indian force would now be silenced and be in their side. It did not happen after the Maoists went to power following the Constituent Assembly election two years ago. This was more pronounced when the Maoists quit the government following the row with the president on the issue concerning the sacking of the army chief. The Maoists openly criticized India for interfering in Nepal’s politics and vowed to fight back. Since then the relationship between the Indian government and the Maoists has strained.
The Indian establishment looked for a suitable candidate who could handle the situation and make some damage control. Shyam Saran was chosen as the suitable candidate to do this job because of his past record and background. Sharan is familiar with the Nepali politics and political parties as he also served as the ambassador of Nepal. He played a key role in bringing the Maoists and parliamentary parties together to sign the 12-point agreement in New Delhi. Saran was, therefore, perceived to have better understanding with the Maoists as well. Similarly, it was Saran’s initiative to create Madhesi parties in Nepal and his role could be effective in uniting the Madhesi parties together once again.
Saran’s visit was, thus, aimed at keeping the non-Maoist forces together so that the Maoists are out of power. The first priority was to unite the Madhesi parties in which Saran’s mission has been successful. Now India has ensured that the Maoists would not be able to go to power unless they make significant shift in their policy towards India. Saran’s mission was neither to help consensus building nor complete the peace process but to ensure that politics in Nepal may not go out of New Delhi’s hand.
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